Winner, Best Appellate Brief in the 2006 Native American Law Student Association Moot Court Competition by Krispinsky, Sean P. & Bannister, Sarah J.
American Indian Law Review
Volume 31 | Number 1
1-1-2006
Winner, Best Appellate Brief in the 2006 Native
American Law Student Association Moot Court
Competition
Sean P. Krispinsky
Sarah J. Bannister
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sean P. Krispinsky & Sarah J. Bannister, Winner, Best Appellate Brief in the 2006 Native American Law Student Association Moot Court
Competition, 31 Am. Indian L. Rev. 225 (2006),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol31/iss1/10
WINNER, BEST APPELLATE BRIEF IN THE 2006 NATIVE
AMERICAN LAW STUDENT ASSOCIATION MOOT COURT
COMPETITION
Sean P. Krispinsky" & Sarah J. Bannister-
Questions Presented
1) Whether Integer's water rights adjudication statute satisfies the
McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666?
2) Whether the Integer Supreme Court correctly determined the purpose of
the Fish River Indian Reservation?
3) Whether reacquired tribal land holds a date-of-reservation priority date?
Opinions Below
The opinion of the Integer Supreme Court is unreported. The order and
judgment of the Integer district court are also unreported.
Statement of Jurisdiction
The Integer Supreme Court entered its final judgment. Subsequently, a
petition for a writ of certiorari was granted by this Court. The jurisdiction of
this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
Statutes Involved
Relevant provisions of the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666, are
reproduced as an appendix to this brief.
Statement of the Case
The Fish River Indian Reservation ("Reservation") occupies 100,000 acres
at the convergence of the Blue and Fish Rivers within the State of Integer. (R.
at 1.) In addition to its importance as a source of water for agricultural
irrigation, the Blue River also supports commercial and sport fisheries. Id.
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The Reservation was established by an 1882 Executive Order ("Order")
enacted pursuant to an Act of Congress authorizing the establishment of
reservations within the State of Integer "for the Indians of the Fish River area
and such other Indians as the President may decide to settle thereon." Id. The
Act also authorized federal funds for housing, health care, and training in the
"agricultural arts" for Indians of the Fish River Reservation. Id.
Although the 1882 Order did not explicitly state the purpose of the
Reservation, the lead federal negotiator observed in a letter to the President
appended to the Order that "the Indians much love this site due to its ready
access to fishing grounds." Id. Furthermore, the negotiator "recommended
the selected [Reservation] site because it contain[ed] lands suitable for
irrigated agriculture and [would] facilitate the conversion of the Indians to a
farming economy." Id. Historical documents relating to the course of
negotiations indicate that the Fish River Indians depended on fish in the Blue
River and that the tribal leaders insisted on locating the reservation near the
Blue River. Id.
In 1893, the reservation was allotted pursuant to the General Allotment Act
of 1887, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), and by 1934,90,000 of the reservation's original
100,000 acres were owned by non-Indians (R. at 1). Following the passage of
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2000), the Fish
River Indians formed a tribal government (Confederated Tribes of the Fish
River Indian Reservation or "Tribes") and eventually reacquired through
purchase 40,000 of the 90,000 acres sold to non-Indians (R. at 1).
At present, non-Indians own 50,000 acres within the Reservation and use
water from the Blue River to irrigate their crops. Id. Although the tribal
government has placed only 10,000 acres of its reacquired land under
irrigation, it could convert an additional 25,000 acres of reacquired land to
agricultural production with proper irrigation. Id. The Blue River provides
only enough water to irrigate 60,000 acres on the reservation; the total acreage
of the Indian and the non-Indian landowners to be irrigated is 85,000 acres.
See id.
The State of Integer commenced an adjudication of the surface water rights
to the Blue River and its tributaries. (R. at 1.) The Integer Department of
Water Resources ("IDWR") is authorized to commence such an adjudication
and does so by notifying all potential claimants that they must file claims. Id.
The United States asked the IDWR to dismiss the adjudication on the grounds
that the Integer adjudication scheme did not satisfy the McCarran
Amendment. (R. at 2.) The IDWR deferred decision on the dismissal and
required the United States to file its claims. Id.
[Vol. 31
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Subsequently, the United States filed four claims for water on behalf of the
Tribes: (1) water for domestic, commercial, municipal, and industrial use
("DCMI"); (2) water for heavy commercial use in developing a tourist resort
on the reservation; (3) water for agricultural irrigation use for the 35,000 acres
of reacquired tribal land and individual Indian allotments; and (4) water to
supply the tribal fisheries. (R. at 2.) The United States claimed an 1882 date-
of-reservation priority date for all water claims. Id. The IDWR refused to
dismiss the proceeding and rejected the DCMI, heavy commercial, and
fisheries claims, but approved the irrigation claim and awarded those water
rights a priority date of 1882. Id. The IDWR determined that the practicably
irrigable acreage ("PIA") standard should be used to quantify the Tribes'
water rights. Id.
The district court affirmed the IDWR's determination with regards to the
McCarran Amendment, and concluded that it had to give deference to IDWR
findings of fact, and would uphold any "reasonable" interpretations of law. (R.
at 2.) The district court also affirmed the IDWR's decision to allow only the
Tribes' water claims for agricultural irrigation use based on the court's
determination that the primary purpose of the Reservation was to convert the
Indians into a farming community. (R. at 3.) The district court agreed with
the IDWR's determination that the reacquired tribal lands held a priority date
of 1882 and that the Tribes' water rights should be quantified using the PIA
standard. Id. The Integer Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district
court without opinion. Id.
Summary ofArgument
The Integer Supreme Court erred in concluding that the McCarran
Amendment is satisfied by the Integer water rights adjudication scheme. The
requisite strict construction that ought to be afforded to waivers of sovereign
immunity was never employed by the Integer courts. Consequently, the
Integer Supreme Court incorrectly concluded that the McCarran Amendment's
definition of "suit" would include an administrative proceeding as long as
there is a provision allowing for judicial review. In addition to clearly
violating the plain language meaning of the text of the McCarran Amendment,
this interpretation also ignores the concerns that this Court has expressed in
determining the scope and protections necessary for evaluating the waiver of
immunity under the Amendment. Furthermore, the Integer Supreme Court
erred in concluding that the present water rights adjudication was
comprehensive. Because the adjudication fails to assess the groundwater
rights of the parties involved, any disposition reached as to the respective
No. 1]
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surface water rights of the Blue River will be subject to ongoing piecemeal
litigation due to the nature of the reserved rights that the United States and
Confederated Tribes of the Fish River Indian Reservation possess.
The Integer Supreme Court also erred in determining that the primary
purpose of the Fish River Indian Reservation was to create an agricultural
community. The text and supporting documents of the Executive Order
creating the Reservation, interpreted in light of the federal government's
policy goal of supporting tribal self-sufficiency, indicate that the Reservation
was established with the purpose of serving as a permanent homeland for the
Fish River Tribes. The creation of the Fish River Reservation as a permanent
homeland impliedly reserved sufficient water for the Tribes to use their lands
and natural resources to create a livable domestic environment and to generate
income for tribal members through multiple activities, including agriculture,
fishing, and tourism. Application of the Gila River quantification method
mandates that the Integer Supreme Court should have granted the Tribes'
claims for water for domestic and municipal uses based on present
consumption rates and future population forecasts, development of its
proposed tourist resort, irrigation of up to 35,000 acres of cropland, and
maintenance of tribal fisheries.
The Integer Supreme Court correctly determined that the reacquired tribal
lands hold an 1882 priority date for their appropriative water rights. When a
tribe reacquires land from non-Indian purchaser, the tribe regains all water
rights that have not been lost through nonuse with their original date-of-
reservation priority date. Because there is no indication that the non-Indian
purchasers of the 40,000 acres of allotted land forfeited any of the original
reserved water rights through nonuse, the Tribes regained their original water
rights with the 1882 priority date upon repurchase of the land.
Argument
I. The Integer Supreme Court Erred in Concluding That the Requirements
of the McCarran Amendment Are Satisfied Under the Integer Water Rights
Adjudication Scheme
Enacted in 1952, and codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666 (2000), the McCarran
Amendment "waives United States sovereign immunity should the United
States be joined as a party in a state-court general water rights' adjudication."
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 146 (1976). The Amendment is
designed to facilitate the comprehensive determination of water rights in an
effort to avoid the "piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system."
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819
228 [Vol. 31
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(1976). Additionally, the Amendment is an effort to "avoid[] the generation
of additional litigation through permitting inconsistent dispositions of [water
rights]." Id. at 819. Indeed, "with respect to water rights, the relationships
among which are highly interdependent," the adjudication of such interests is
"best conducted in unified proceedings." Id.
A. In Contravention of This Court's Jurisprudence, the Integer Supreme
Court Failed to Recognize That Waivers of Sovereign Immunity by the
United States Must Be Narrowly Construed
It is a fundamental principle of this Court's jurisprudence that "[t]he
Government is not liable to suit unless it consents thereto, and its liability in
suit cannot be extended beyond the plain language of the statute authorizing
it." Price v. United States, 174 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1899). The "limitations and
conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly
observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied." Lehman v. Nakshian,
453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981). To be sure, "'[a]ny such waiver must be strictly
construed in favor of the United States,' Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 137
(1991), and not enlarged beyond what the language of the statute requires."
United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1, 7 (1993). This Court has also explained
that "waivers of federal sovereign immunity must be 'unequivocally
expressed' in the statutory text," id. at 6, and neither the Executive Branch nor
the Judicial Branch can effect a waiver of sovereign immunity, because such
decisions have been relegated exclusively to the acumen of Congress, see
OPMv. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 424-34 (1990); United States v. Shaw, 309
U.S. 415, 501-02 (1940).
The McCarran Amendment is undoubtedly subject to the same rules of
construction that apply to other waivers of sovereign immunity. See Idaho,
508 U.S. at 6-8 (rejecting the application of a relaxed set of interpretive rules
when considering the McCarran Amendment and endorsing a strict
construction of the Amendment along with a reiteration of the aforementioned
rules of interpretation for waivers of sovereign immunity). Consequently, in
affirming the state district court decision without opinion, (R. at 3), the Integer
Supreme Court sanctioned the flawed conclusion that a provision for judicial
review can convert an administrative process into a "suit" within the meaning
of the McCarran Amendment, (R. at 2). Not only did the courts below provide
little more than mere conjecture to support this proposition, (see R. at 2-3
(concluding without analysis that "the provision for judicial review" made
Integer's procedure a "suit"); R. at 3 (affirming the district court's conclusion
without opinion)), but the Integer courts also clearly failed to recognize that
this Court's precedent demands an exacting consideration of the specific
No. 1]
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language that a statute utilizes in waiving sovereign immunity. Compare
Idaho, 508 U.S. at 7 (waiver must not be "enlarged beyond what the language
of the statute requires"), with (R. at 2-3 (failing to employ or even demonstrate
an acknowledgement of the requisite strict-construction standard for
interpreting waivers of United States sovereign immunity)).
Thus, the Integer Supreme Court neglected to adhere to this Court's
admonition that the "statutory text" must provide an unequivocal expression
of the actual waiver of sovereign immunity. Idaho, 508 U.S. at 6. Such a
failure by the court below ignores this Court's pronouncement that:
[1]n granting such consent Congress has an absolute discretion to
specify the cases and contingencies in which the liability of the
government is submitted to the courts for judicial determination.
Beyond the letter of such consent the courts may not go, no matter
how beneficial they may deem or in fact might be their possession
of a larger jurisdiction over the liabilities of the government.
Price, 174 U.S. at 376 (quoting Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 166
(1894)) (emphasis added). Necessarily included within Congress's power is
the authority to determine when bodies other than the courts may settle on the
scope and application of the waiver of sovereign immunity.
Here, the text of the McCarran Amendment provides no explicit waiver of
the United States' sovereign immunity to state administrative proceedings.
See generally 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (referring only to "any suit" and "the
judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction," and never
mentioning state administrative proceedings) (emphasis added). In addition,
this Court's most recent decision regarding the interpretation of waivers of
sovereign immunity strongly advises against reading "into the [waiver]
something that isn't there," and reaffirms a strict judicial adherence to the
explicit language of the waiver. See United States v. Olson, 126 S. Ct. 510,
512 (2005) (holding in the context of the Federal Tort Claims Act that the
liability of a "private person" means nothing more than the liability of a
"private person," and therefore does not incorporate the liability of a "state or
municipal entity.") In addition to highlighting the grave methodological error
of the court below, this Court's contemporary sovereign immunity decisions
reaffirm Congress's exclusive "discretion to specify the cases and
contingencies in which the liability of the government is submitted to the
courts," id., and unambiguously compels a strict construction of the "consent
... given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit ... for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source," 43
U.S.C. § 666(a).
[Vol. 31
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B. The Integer Supreme Court Erred in Concluding That the United States
Had Been Properly Joined Pursuant to the McCarran Amendment Because
the Integer Adjudication Process Does Not Make the United States a
Defendant in Any Suit
Although the Integer Supreme Court affirmed the view "that the provision
for judicial review made [the proceeding below] a 'suit' within the court's
jurisdiction," (R. at 2-3), the court's failure to justify its conclusion leaves us
to presume that the state court erred in its application of this Court's mandates
for properly interpreting waivers of sovereign immunity. Even if we assume
arguendo that the Integer Supreme Court employed the appropriate analytical
framework when making its decision, the plain language meaning of the
phrase "defendant in any suit" clearly indicates that Congress did not intend
to expand the United States' liability to include the determinations and
predilections of various state administrative schemes.
1. The Plain Language Meaning of the Phrase "Defendant in Any Suit"
Does Not Include Parties to State Administrative Proceedings
The text of the McCarran Amendment makes it quite clear that Congress
intended to waive the United States' immunity only in judicial proceedings.
Congress permitted the "[j]oinder of [the] United States as defendant" in the
McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666(a), by giving consent to:
[J]oin the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where.., the
United States is a necessary party to such suit,.., and [the United
States] shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the
court havingjurisdiction .... Provided, That nojudgment for costs
shall be entered against the United States in any such suit.
Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, § 666(b) provides that "[s]ummons or
other process in any such suit shall be served upon the Attorney General or his
designated representative." In addition to the inherently legalistic nature of
the phrases "suit," "defendant," "summons," and "process," is the inescapable
textual mandate that the United States be subject only to the 'judgments,
orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction." Id. (emphasis added).
This latter phrase provides textual guidance as to what Congress meant by
"suit." The McCarran Amendment certainly does not provide that the United
States will also be subject to the decisions of any administrative agency
having jurisdiction where the United States is a participant. Therefore, the
No. 1]
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plain language reading of the statute implores the conclusion that the Court
refrain from "read[ing] into the Act something that is not there." Olson, 126
S. Ct. at 512.
This conclusion is bolstered by this Court's assessment of what constitutes
a "suit." As was demonstrated by Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v.
Virginia, this Court has always presumed that a "suit" can be commenced and
prosecuted only in a "Court of Justice." 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 407-08
(1821). In Upshur County v. Rich, this Court declared that:
[A] proceeding, not in a court of justice, but carried on by
executive officers in the exercise of their proper functions ... is
purely administrative in its character, and cannot, in any just sense,
be called a suit; and that an appeal in such a case, to a board of
assessors or commissioners having no judicial powers, and only
authorized to determine questions of quantity, proportion and
value, is not a suit.
135 U.S. 467, 477 (1890). As applied to the Integer adjudicatory scheme,
where "IDWR makes an initial recommendation regarding disposition of the
claims and then hears objections from claimants and others who object to
IDWR's recommendation," (R. at 1), which is then followed by IDWR making
a final "determination on a claimed right," id., this Court's accepted definition
of "suit" is clearly not satisfied. See also Weston v. City Council of
Charleston, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449, 464 (1829) ("[I]f a right is litigated between
parties in a court ofjustice, the proceeding by which the decision of the court
is sought is a suit."); Rank v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 1, 71-72 (S.D. Cal.
1956) (discussing the preceding cases and concluding that "[t]he word 'suit'
does not include a proceeding before a State Water Board") (emphasis in
original).
Such a result is further supported by the various dictionary definitions
presently in use, as well as those relied on at the time the McCarran
Amendment was passed. The contemporary dictionary definition of "suit" is
"an action or process in a court for the recovery of a right or claim." Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1178 (10th ed. 1996) (emphasis added); see
also Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) ("Any proceeding by a party or
parties against another in a court of law") (emphasis added). Furthermore:
Dictionary definitions of "suit" at the time of the McCarran
Amendment's enactment similarly show that the term properly
refers to a proceeding initiated and conducted in a court, not an
administrative proceeding. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1602
(4th ed. 1951) ("applies to any proceeding by one person or
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol31/iss1/10
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persons against another or others in a court ofjustice"); Bouvier's
Law Dictionary 1148 (Baldwin's Century ed. 1948); Ballentinie's
Law Dictionary 1249 (1948 ed.); The Cyclopedic Law Dictionary
1609 (3d ed. 1940).
Br. of the Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee at 30 n.15, United States v.
Oregon, 44 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-36983). Consequently, the plain
language reading of the McCarran Amendment, this Court's assessment of
what constitutes a "suit," and the relevant dictionary definitions from the time
of the McCarran Amendment's passage as well as today, all compel the
conclusion that Integer's administrative procedure does not satisfy Congress's
requirement that the United States be joined as a "defendant" in a "suit." It
is appropriate to conclude that Congress intended to limit the waiver of United
States sovereign immunity to only those proceedings that can be considered
a suit. Such proceedings must necessarily take place in a "court having
jurisdiction."' See 43 U.S.C. § 666(a).
2. The Integer Supreme Court Erroneously Concluded That the Mere
Provision for Judicial Review Converts the IDWR Disposition into a Suit
Within the Meaning of the McCarran Amendment
Although it is a basic notion of procedural due process that as long as an
administrative determination can be reviewed by a court it will satisfy the
basic concerns of the Due Process Clause, see Yakus v. United States, 321
U.S. 414, 433, 444 (1944), it is also a fundamental tenet of procedure that
Congress may always require more than the protections mandated by the Due
Process Clause, see Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 692-93 (1979).
Notwithstanding this Court's procedural due process jurisprudence, in the
unique context of Congressional waivers of sovereign immunity, there is a
presumption against broad waivers of immunity, and a strict adherence to the
protections mandated by Congress. See supra Part L.a. When assessing
1. Although not necessary under this Court's plain language strict construction approach
to waivers of sovereign immunity, it is also worth noting that the legislative history of the
McCarran Amendment demonstrates that Congress implicitly considered and rejected consent
to the jurisdiction of state administrative agencies in addition to state courts, as Congress clearly
understood at the time that consent to the jurisdiction of both was an option. Compare S. Rep.
No. 82-755, at 5 (1951) (specifically limiting conferral of McCarran Amendment jurisdiction
to "state courts") with H.R. Rep. No. 82-7691 (1952) (considering whether to submit to the
jurisdiction of both "judicial and administrative agencies" for the disposition of "rights to the
use of water or the administration of such rights."); see also Br. of the Plaintiff/Appellant/
Cross-Appellee at 36, United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-36983).
No. 1]
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whether Integer's procedures comport with Congress's specific waiver of
immunity, it is a mistake to conclude that basic principles of procedural due
process ought to counsel our understanding of the scope of the waiver of
sovereign immunity. Therefore, when the Integer Supreme Court endorsed the
view that by merely providing a potential mode ofjudicial review the Integer
scheme satisfied the "suit" requirement of the McCarran Amendment, the
court mistakenly mixed two very distinct lines of this Court's precedent.
The Integer Supreme Court concluded that the IDWR proceeding was a
"' suit' within the court's jurisdiction" because of "the provision for judicial
review." (R. at 2-3.) Under Integer's scheme, "[a]ny party dissatisfied with
IDWR's determination is authorized to appeal the decision to a special state
district court vested with jurisdiction to hear water rights appeals from the
IDWR." (R. at 1.) Subsequently, "[t]he opposing party on any appeal to the
district court is the IDWR and any other water right claimant who objects to
a particular determination." Id. However, because the Integer Supreme Court
affirmed the view that "review of the IDWR decision [is] governed by the
state administrative procedure act," id. at 2-3, reviewing courts are "bound to
give deference to agency findings of fact and to uphold 'reasonable'
interpretations of state law," id.
a) The Integer Supreme Court Erred in Concluding That the Provision
for Judicial Review Converted the IDWR Proceeding into a Suit
In concluding that the challenged IDWR proceeding was a "suit" that
satisfied the conditions of waiver set forth in the McCarran Amendment, (see
R. at 2-3), the Integer Supreme Court mistakenly concluded that the possibility
of appeal somehow converted an administrative proceeding into a court
proceeding thereby satisfying the plain language meaning of "suit." As
demonstrated supra Part I.b.i., the IDWR proceeding itself certainly does not
constitute a "suit" within the meaning of the McCarran Amendment.
However, neither can the provision for judicial review transform the IDWR
proceeding into anything more than a simple state administrative proceeding.
It is apparent that the court erred in applying this Court's jurisprudence by
attributing a status to the administrative proceedings of the IDWR
retroactively. (See R. at 2-3 (concluding that the IDWR proceeding was
"made... a 'suit" because of "the provision for judicial review."))
Although noting that "a proceeding, not in a court ofjustice, but carried on
by executive officers in the exercise of their proper functions . . . is purely
administrative in its character, and cannot in any just sense, be called a suit,"
Upshur County, 135 U.S. at 477, this Court also recognized that at some point,
the status of the proceeding can change, reflective of the forum in which it is
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol31/iss1/10
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conducted. While an administrative appeal, without more, will also fall short
of constituting a suit, see id., this Court has nevertheless acknowledged that
"such an appeal may become a suit, if made to a court or tribunal having
power to determine questions of law and fact, either with or without a jury,
and there are parties litigant to contest the case on the one side and the other,"
id.
As applied to the Integer adjudicatory scheme, the Upshur County holding
compels the conclusion that the IDWR proceeding is not a suit. At most,
when on appeal to the special district court the proceeding may become a suit,
but not prior to the presence of the "parties litigant" before a court with the
general "power to determine questions of law and fact." Id. Since the IDWR
is not a "court ofjustice" vested with the powers to "determine questions of
law and fact," id., but rather is an "executive" agency "purely administrative
in its character," id., only upon the successful granting and commencement of
an appeal could the proceeding even arguably be considered a suit.
Nevertheless, such a procedure would explicitly violate the mandates and
intent of the McCarran Amendment.
b) Even If the Integer Proceeding Becomes a Suit, This Status Would
Vest at the Appellate Stage of the Proceeding, and Would Consequently
Not Satisfy the McCarran Amendment
There are five critical flaws with the Integer Supreme Court's conclusion
that merely providing for judicial review of the IDWR decision satisfies the
McCarran Amendment. (See R. at 3.) These flaws all demonstrate that even
if the proceeding could be considered a suit at the appellate stage, such a
system violates the scope of waiver articulated in the McCarran Amendment's
text. First, as demonstrated supra Part I.b.ii., it would be a grave
misapplication of this Court'sjurisprudence to conclude that merely satisfying
the requirements of the Due Process Clause, by allowing for judicial review
of administrative decisions, translates into the fulfillment of the McCarran
Amendment. Nowhere in the McCarran Amendment does the text allude to
consent being granted to a scheme that merely provides for judicial review of
an administrative determination.
Second, it is unclear whether a dissatisfied party "authorized to appeal" the
IDWR decision can claim this appeal as a matter of right, or if Integer has
merely provided for the discretionary appeal of certain decisions, akin to
certiorari, which would depend entirely on the district court's predilections
regarding the appeal. (See R. at 1 (declaring only that an appeal is
"authorized," but not that it may be invoked as a matter of right).) The Integer
courts offer no guidance on point, and therefore, it is unclear whether the
No. 1]
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Integer district court will necessarily play a role even if an appeal is requested.
Hence, it is uncertain whether the proceeding will ever have the potential to
reach the status of a "suit."
Third, even if Integer provides an appeal by right from the IDWR
disposition, there nevertheless is no court involvement prior to the appeal.
Consequently, the McCarran Amendment is not satisfied during the IDWR
proceedings because these proceedings are not the "suit" that Congress
consented to. See 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (giving consent to "join the United
States as a defendant in any suit" but not consenting to joining the United
States in an administrative proceeding that precedes a suit).
Fourth, under a scheme where the appeal constitutes a "suit" for purposes
of satisfying the McCarran Amendment, the United States would not be the
defendant at the point of suit, as the terms of the Amendment specifically
prescribe. See id. Indeed, although "[c]onsent is given to join the United
States as a defendant in any suit," id. (emphasis added), the fact that the
United States is no longer the defendant when the suit is established upon
appeal demonstrates that such a system is precisely not what Congress
intended. It is clear that a "suit" is requisite from the initial point ofjoinder
of the United States, rather than after the fact, when the United States is
actually the petitioner, if not the plaintiff, in the actual "suit."
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even if we ignore the
aforementioned flaws and assume arguendo that it is otherwise acceptable for
the "suit" provision of the Amendment to vest at the appellate stage of
Integer's proceedings, the fact that the Integer courts give such substantial
deference to the IDWR's "findings of fact" (R. at 2), and will also uphold any
"reasonable interpretations" of law, id., demonstrates that the Integer scheme
effectively prevents a "suit ... for the adjudication of rights to the use of
water of a river system or other source" from occurring at the appellate stage.
See 43 U.S.C. § 666(a). Integer's scheme makes the IDWR's factual
determinations dispositive, and accordingly, hobbles the court's involvement,
whether there is an appeal or not. Because of the deference afforded to the
IDWR under the Integer administrative procedure act, (see R. at 2), the rights
of the United States and the Tribes are determined prior to the appellate stage
of the proceeding. Therefore, the McCarran Amendment's condition that the
"suit" must be for the "adjudication of rights" is virtually ignored under
Integer's scheme. Rather, Integer has manifested a system where the
"adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system," 43 U.S.C. §
666(a), occurs prior to the initiation of a "suit." Such a scheme is clearly
beyond the scope of any reasonable plain language reading of the McCarran
Amendment. See id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol31/iss1/10
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3. The Integer Supreme Court Failed to Adequately Recognize the
Significance That This Court Has Placed on the Adequacy of State
Proceedings Undertaken Pursuant to the McCarran Amendment
In the context of water rights adjudication generally, and the McCarran
Amendment specifically, the procedural safeguards and the fact-finding
mechanisms employed during the initial disposition of rights are critical.
Indeed, factual determinations can often be dispositive to the disposition of
water rights. See, e.g., Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 143 n.7 (noting the significance
of the factual determination that pumping within two and one half miles of a
pond would infringe on reserved rights). Furthermore, for the interests of
affected tribes and the United States to be adequately protected under the
McCarran Amendment's design, the relevant adjudicatory system must ensure
recognition of the fact that "questions [arising from the collision of private
rights and reserved rights of the United States], including the volume and
scope of particular reserved rights, are federal questions which, if preserved,
can be reviewed [by the Supreme Court] after final judgment by the [state]
court." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813 (quoting United States v. District
Courtfor Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520,526 (1971)) (first and second alteration
in original). However, if the administrative proceeding fails to provide
adequate procedures, akin to those commonly afforded in courts of law, it is
likely that there will be a substantial risk that these "federal questions" are not
preserved or recognized in the record of the state proceeding. See Arizona v.
San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 570 (1983) (recognizing that only if
"the state adjudications are adequate to quantify the rights at issue in the
federal suits" will it be permissible for a federal court to dismiss a case in
favor of a "state court" proceeding pursuant to the McCarran Amendment);
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 820 (noting that "if the state proceeding were in
some respect inadequate to resolve the federal claims," it may be appropriate
for a federal court to refrain from dismissing a proceeding in favor of a state
''court").
The Colorado River standard requires federal courts to acknowledge the
intent of the McCarran Amendment and defer to state courts the jurisdiction
to adjudicate comprehensive water right dispositions. Id. This obligation is
limited, however, by this Court's subsequent recognition that the adequacy of
state proceedings is critical when assessing whether a federal court should
relinquish such jurisdiction. See San Carlos Apache, 463 U.S. at 570. This
Court has persistently tied the presumptive adequacy of state proceedings to
the use of state courts in assessing the dispositions of water rights. See, e.g.,
id. at 548-49, 569-71 (employing references throughout to "state courts," and
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concluding that "any state-court decision alleged to abridge Indian water
rights protected by federal law can expect to receive, if brought before [the
Supreme Court], a particularized and exacting scrutiny commensurate with the
powerful federal interest in safeguarding those rights from state
encroachment"); Moses H. Cone Mem '1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1, 19 (1983) (describing the choice of federal courts when deciding to
refrain from exercising jurisdiction over water rights as a "decision whether
to defer to state courts"); Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 809-14, 817
(considering only "state courts" throughout). To be sure, such an
interpretation is arguably bolstered by the principle of parity among the state
and federal courts.
Furthermore, one of the critical reasons given by this Court in Colorado
River to implore the federal courts to refrain from exercising theirjurisdiction
was "to avoid duplicative litigation." Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817. This
interest is not supported when the state proceeding does not rise to the level
of a "suit" until an appeal is made. Indeed, the standards that a state
proceeding must satisfy in order to be deferred to under the McCarran
Amendment are higher than those required for federal courts to exercise any
of the rare abstention doctrines. See id. at 818 ("[T]he circumstances
permitting the dismissal of a federal suit due to the presence of a concurrent
state proceeding for reasons of wise judicial administration are considerably
more limited than the circumstances appropriate for abstention."); Moses H.
Cone, 460 U.S. at 15 (same). Since the majority of Integer's scheme is
administrative, and therefore executive in nature, see supra Part I.b.i, these
concerns are not present here.
The Integer system fails to properly recognize that despite the fact that the
present action has come before this Court, the adequacy of state procedures
depend on the presumption that federal courts will not need to be employed
later in the process to protect the rights of the United States or any concerned
tribes. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 28 (1983) ("[T]he decision to invoke
Colorado River necessarily contemplates that the federal court will have
nothing further to do in resolving any substantive part of the case, whether it
stays or dismisses.") Here, because the Integer system relies primarily on
administrative adjudication, reviewed by a water court employing an
extremely deferential standard, (see R. at 1-3), it is likely that the federal
courts will necessarily become a persistent means of relief under the Integer
system. Indeed, the present action demonstrates this point. Such a scheme
should trigger this Court's obligation to ensure that Indian water rights,
protected by federal law, are safeguarded from "state encroachment." See San
Carlos Apache, 463 U.S. at 571.
238 [Vol. 31
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol31/iss1/10
SPECIAL FEATURES
4. The Ninth Circuit's Decision in United States v. Oregon Further
Counsels in Favor of Reversing the Integer Supreme Court
In United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 943 (1995), the court of appeals held that Oregon's water rights
adjudication procedure was comprehensive and properly constituted a "suit"
within the meaning of the McCarran Amendment. 44 F.3d at 766-70.
Although the United States continues to assert the view that the decision in
Oregon is inherently flawed, the difference between the situation in Oregon
and the situation here provide additional reasons why reversal of the Integer
Supreme Court is necessary. See Br. for the United States in Opp'n to Pet. for
Writ of Cert. at 7-12, Klamath Tribe v. Oregon, 516 U.S. 943 (1995)(No. 95-
151) (arguing that although the Ninth Circuit erred in its interpretation of the
scope of liability under the McCarran Amendment, because of the posture of
the proceeding and the absence of any other opinions on point, certiorari was
unwarranted at that time).
First, in Oregon, the state court was automatically made a part of the
adjudication process because ajudicial hearing was automatically scheduled.
44 F.3d at 764. Here, a dissatisfied party is "authorized to appeal" an IDWR
decision, however, it is unclear whether this authorization constitutes an
appeal by right. See supra Part I.b.ii.2. Thus, in the Oregon system, the court
is literally supervising all determinations made by the state administrative
agency, but here this may never be the case. Furthermore, the United States
would arguably remain the defendant in the Oregon proceeding since an
appeal is not necessary to trigger review by a court.
Second, in Oregon, the supervising court was also required to enter a final
judgment, "affirming or modifying the order as it considers proper." 44 F.3d
at 764. Here, if there is an appeal to the Integer courts, an uncertainty to be
sure, the court nevertheless must adhere to the deferential standard required
by the Integer administrative procedure act. (R. at 2.) This latter system
effectively makes the relevant adjudication occur at the agency level. In the
Oregon system, the court performs de novo review of all agency
determinations. See Br. for the United States in Opp'n to Pet. for Writ of Cert.
at 9-10 (the Oregon "state court will accord de novo review to the
administrative water right determinations in the judicial review phase of the
... adjudication.") Here, the Integer courts afford deference to the IDWR's
findings of fact and conclusions of law. (See R. at. 2).
Finally, the posture in the Oregon proceeding was tremendously different
from the posture in this case. In Oregon, the United States and Klamath Tribe
were challenging the proceeding in federal court prior to any actual
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adjudication. See 44 F.3d at 762-63. In light of the assurance that the Oregon
courts would employ de novo review of the adjudication, the threat of
complete disregard for the United States' and Klamath Tribe's rights as a
result of the whims and bias of the Oregon agency was minimized. See also
Br. for the United States in Opp'n to Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 9. Conversely,
in the case at bar, the Integer system has taken full effect, and the merits of the
adjudication were assessed despite the efforts of the United States and the
Confederated Tribes of the Fish River Indian Reservation. With the minor
exception of the IDWR's priority date determination, the Integer courts have
afforded total deference to the IDWR's findings and conclusions. (See R. at
2-3.) This difference in posture demonstrates a particular need for this Court
to reverse the Integer Supreme Court, and find that the IDWR process flouts
the McCarran Amendment.
C. In Contravention of This Court's Jurisprudence, Integer Failed to
Require the Comprehensive Adjudication of Rights to the Use of Water of a
River System or Other Source
Congress has consented to a waiver of the United States sovereign
immunity only in cases "involving a general adjudication of 'all of the rights
of various owners on a given stream."' Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618
(1963) (citation omitted). In explaining this comprehensiveness requirement,
this Court noted that:
The McCarran Amendment, as interpreted in Colorado River,
allows and encourages state courts to undertake the task of
quantifying Indian water rights in the course of comprehensive
water adjudications. Although adjudication of those rights in
federal court instead might in the abstract be practical, and even
wise, it will be neither practical nor wise as long as it creates the
possibility of duplicative litigation, tension and controversy
between the federal and state forums, hurried and pressured
decisionmaking, and confusion over the disposition of property
rights.
San Carlos Apache, 463 U.S. at 569 (emphasis added). Therefore, the
comprehensiveness requirement is designed to ensure the "'conservation of
judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation."' Colorado
River, 424 U.S. at 817 (citation omitted).
Here, the Integer proceeding has failed to satisfy this Court's
comprehensiveness requirement because the proceeding only adjudicated
"surface water rights from the Blue River and its tributaries." (R. at 1.)
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Although the Integer Supreme Court endorsed the view that "the proceeding
was sufficiently comprehensive under the requirements of the McCarran
Amendment," (R. at 2-3), this conclusion is nevertheless without rationale and
in direct contravention of this Court's jurisprudence. By ignoring the
adjudication of all groundwater claims, the Integer proceeding merely begs
future litigation of the surface water rights established in the present
proceeding.
This Court has recognized that "'[g]roundwater and surface water are
physically interrelated as integral parts of the hydrologic cycle."' Cappaert,
426 U.S. at 142 (citation omitted). As a result of this interrelation, the
Cappaert court held that "since the implied-reservation-of-water-rights
doctrine is based on the necessity of water for the purpose of the federal
reservation, . . . the United States can protect its water from subsequent
diversion, whether the diversion is of surface or groundwater." Id. at 143.
Therefore, because of the fact that the Tribes' and United States' reserved
rights are likely to be affected by future uses of groundwater, the present
adjudication is clearly unsatisfactory under the requirements of the McCarran
Amendment. Due to the hydrological connection between groundwater and
surface water generally, Integer's decision to ignore groundwater will only
result in future piecemeal litigation, in direct contravention of the purpose
behind the McCarran Amendment. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819
(noting that a fundamental purpose of the Amendment is to avoid the
"piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system"). Therefore, the
Integer proceeding also violates the scope of the McCarran Amendment by
failing to comprehensively adjudicate "the use of water of a river system." 43
U.S.C. § 666(a).
II. The Integer Supreme Court Erred in Determining That the Primary
Purpose of the Fish River Reservation Was to Create an Agricultural
Community
A. The 1882 Order Intended to Reserve Water from the Blue River
When the federal government establishes an Indian reservation, it impliedly
reserves water in the amount necessary to accomplish the purposes of the
reservation. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963) ("We...
agree that the United States did reserve the water rights for the Indians
effective as of the time the Indian reservations were created"); Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908); Colville Confederated Tribes v.
Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 46 (9th Cir. 1981). In Winters, the Supreme Court first
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addressed the issue of reserved water rights for Indian reservations when it
adjudicated a dispute over rights to water from the Milk River at the edge of
the Fort Belknap Reservation. Although the 1888 agreement creating the Fort
Belknap Reservation failed to expressly reserve water rights, the Court held
that ambiguities in agreements with the Indians (e.g., the silence regarding
water rights) should "be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians."
Winters, 207 U.S. at 576. Accordingly, because the purpose of the Fort
Belknap reservation was to allow the Indians to become self-sufficient through
raising crops and livestock, see id., and the reservation lands "were arid, and,
without irrigation, were practically valueless," the Court held that the
agreement necessarily reserved rights to sufficient water to fulfill the purposes
of the reservation, id. at 577.
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court affirmed the Winters principle of reserved
water rights for Indian reservations and extended the doctrine to Indian
reservations created by Executive Order. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 598-600. In
Arizona, the Court adjudicated a dispute over the amount of water that the
southwestern states could remove from the Colorado River and its tributaries.
Id. at 551. The United States, relying on the Winters reserved rights doctrine,
asserted water claims on behalf on five Indian reservations (created entirely
or in part by Executive Orders) located in Arizona, California, and Nevada.
Id. at 596. The Court first held that Indian reservations created by Executive
Order possessed the same reserved water rights as those reservations created
by treaty or statute. Id. at 598. Second, the Court held that the federal
government intended to reserve water rights when it established the five
reservations because the "water from the [Colorado] river would be essential
to the life of the Indian people and to the animals they hunted and the crops
they raised." Id. at 599.
Here, the 1882 Order impliedly reserved rights to water from the Blue
River. The Winters doctrine applies to reservations created by Executive
Order, such as the Fish River Reservation. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 598; Colville,
647 F.2d at 46. Furthermore, the history of the negotiations leading to the
Order evince an intent to reserve water rights. The government's lead
negotiator emphasized the Tribes' reliance upon fishing grounds in the Blue
River (R. at 1), indicating the importance of the Blue River to the Indians.
The negotiator also clearly understood that the Indians could not establish an
agricultural society without using water from the Blue River for irrigation.
(See R. at 1.) Thus, the only reasonable interpretation of the Order is that it
meant to reserve enough water for the purposes of the Reservation.
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B. The Integer Supreme Court Should Have Concluded That the Fish River
Reservation Was Created to Provide a Permanent Homeland
1. Indian Reservations Can Be Created for Multiple Purposes and Those
Purposes Should Be Broadly Interpreted to Further the Goals of Tribal
Sovereignty and Economic Self-sufficiency
The purposes for which an Indian reservation was established define the
amount of the water that was reserved. See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600-01;
Colville, 647 F.2d at 47; In Re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use
Water in the Gila River Sys. and Source, 35 P.3d 68, 73 (Ariz. 2001). In
general, a federal reservation of land impliedly reserves only the amount of
water necessary to support the purpose of the reservation. Cappaert, 426 U.S.
at 141 (purpose of a federal reservation of a limestone cavern limited to
preserving the pool and its rare desert fish species). Furthermore, the amount
of water reserved is limited to that necessary to fulfill "the very purposes for
which a federal reservation was created" (i.e., "primary purpose"); water used
to fulfill "secondary" uses of the reserved land is not impliedly reserved.
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978).
Although courts will strictly construe the purpose for which the federal
government reserves non-Indian land, id. at 718 (holding that the purpose of
the government reservation of Gila National Forest was solely to preserve the
timber and continue favorable water flows, not to allow for stockwatering or
wildlife preservation), some courts have suggested that the purposes for which
Indian land is reserved should be given a broader interpretation in order to
further the federal goal of Indian self-sufficiency.2 State ex rel. Greely v.
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d
754, 768 (Mont. 1985) (citing United States v. Finc, 548 F.2d 822, 832 (9th
Cir.1976) rev'don other grounds, 433 U.S. 676 (1977)). In the context of
reserved rights for Indian reservations, courts have been willing to identify
multiple primary purposes for the reservation, rather than limiting the
reservation to one primary purpose. United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394,
1410 (9th Cir. (1983) ("Neither Cappaert nor New Mexico requires us to
choose between these activities [fishing and farming] or to identify a single
2. Although frequently cited by courts in deciding Indian water rights cases, see, e.g.,
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 1981); In re the Gen.
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 94 (Wyo.
1988), aff'd without opinion, 492 U.S. 406 (1989), both Cappaert and New Mexico dealt with
non-Indian federal reservations of land and may not be the appropriate precedent to follow in
determining the scope of Indian reserved water rights. See In re the General Adjudication of
All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 73 (Ariz. 2001).
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
essential purpose which the parties to the 1864 Treaty intended the Klamath
Reservation to serve"); Colville, 647 F.2d at 47-48 (holding that the Colville
Reservation was created for the dual primary purposes of providing for an
agrarian society and preserving the Tribe's access to its fishing grounds);
United States v. Washington, 375 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1064 (W.D. Wash. 2005)
(agreeing that primary purposes of the Lummi Reservation included
agricultural and domestic use).
Traditionally, courts have determined the purposes for which an Indian
reservation was created by examining the text and history of the document
creating the reservation, the history of the Indians for whom the reservation
was created, and even the Indians' need to adapt to changed circumstances.
See Colville Confederated Tribes, 647 F.2d at 47. Treaties and agreements
between the federal government and the Indians should be construed liberally
in favor of the Indians and understood as the Indians themselves would have
understood the terms. See County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 252, 269 (1992); United States
v Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938); Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
Furthermore, the text and history of such agreements should be interpreted in
light of the federal goal of encouraging Indian self-sufficiency. See Greely,
712 P.2d at 768.
2. The Fish River Indian Reservation Was Created for the Broad
Purpose of Providing the Tribes with a Permanent Homeland
The Integer Supreme Court should have decided that the Fish River
Reservation was created for the purpose of providing a homeland for the Fish
River Indians, a purpose that accommodates the Tribes' varied uses of its land
(e.g., tourism, agriculture, and fishing) to achieve economic self-sufficiency.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Indian reservations were created
to create a "home and abiding place" for Indians. Winters, 207 U.S. at 565;
see also Colville, 647 F.2d at 47 (the general purpose of an Indian reservation
is "to provide a home for the Indians" and the purpose "is a broad one and
must be liberally construed.") Recently, the Supreme Court of Arizona held
that "the purpose of a federal Indian reservation is to serve as a 'permanent
home and abiding place' to the Native American people living there." Gila
River, 35 P.3d at 76 (quoting Winters, 207 U.S. at 565). That court endorsed
the "permanent homeland" purpose of an Indian reservation based on concerns
of fairness and respect for the federal policy of encouraging tribal self-
sufficiency and economic development, stating that "just as the nation's
economy has evolved, nothing should prevent tribes from diversifying their
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economies if they so choose and are reasonably able to do so." Gila River, 35
P.3d at 76.
Here, a liberal interpretation of the text and supporting documents of the
1882 Executive Order mandates a finding that the Fish River Reservation was
established for the broad purpose of serving as a permanent homeland for the
Indians, rather than just for the narrow purpose of creating an agricultural
community. Like the Executive Order creating the Indian reservation in
Colville, 647 F.2d at 47 n.8, the Act of Congress authorizing the creation of
the Fish River Reservation simply stated that the Reservation was "for the
Indians of the Fish River area ... to settle thereon," (R. at 1). Liberally
construed, this language indicates that the federal government intended the
Fish River Indians to settle permanently on the Reservation and become self-
sufficient. The documents and circumstances surrounding the creation of the
Reservation support this liberal interpretation. Although the federal
government's lead negotiator recommended the Reservation's location based
on "its suitab[ility] for irrigated agriculture," (R. at 1), the Indians probably
did not believe that the Reservation was established solely for agricultural
purposes. Indeed, the tribal leaders insisted on locating the Reservation near
the Blue River to preserve the Indians' access to fish. Id. The negotiator
himself acknowledged the importance of the Blue River fishing grounds to the
Indians, id., indicating that the federal government took the Indians'
traditional reliance on fishing into consideration when it established the
Reservation. Id. Additionally, the federal government's commitment to
"provid[ing] health care, housing and training in the 'agricultural arts' for any
Indians of any reservation," (R. at 1), further support a finding that the
government was trying to give the Indians the land and resources to create a
stable, permanent self-sufficient society.
The appellee's argument that the purpose of the Fish River Reservation
cannot be to serve as a permanent homeland based on the reasoning of In Re
the Gen. Adjudication ofAll Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys.,
753 P.2d 76,94 (Wyo. 1988), aff'dwithout opinion, 492 U.S. 406 (1989), will
fail because the Big Horn rationale has not been expressly adopted by this
Court and the Big Horn court's analysis was severely flawed. In Big Horn, as
part of its adjudication of the dispute over rights to water from the Big Horn
River System, the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
Wind River Reservation was established for the purpose of providing the
Indians with a permanent homeland. Id. at 97. Although this Court affirmed
this decision, it did so without an opinion, leaving courts outside the state of
Wyoming free to find that the purpose of a federal Indian reservation is to
serve as a permanent homeland. See Gila River, 35 F.3d at 76.
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This Court should reject the rationale of the Wyoming Supreme Court in
Big Horn and find that the purpose of the Fish River Indian Reservation was
to provide the Fish River Indian Tribes with a permanent homeland for two
reasons. First, the Big Horn court applied an excessively formalistic and rigid
treaty interpretation technique to reject the permanent homeland purpose
argument. For example, the treaty stated that the lands comprising the Wind
River Reservation would be "set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use
and occupation of the Shoshone Indians" and for other Indians. BigHorn, 753
F.2d at 95 (quotation marks omitted). The treaty does not state that the land
was set aside only for agricultural purposes; one could reasonably infer from
the treaty language that the Shoshone could use the land for agriculture, but
were not required to do so. Additionally, the court misinterpreted explicit
treaty references to the federal government's desire to "civilize" the tribes by
converting them into farmers to mean that the reservation lands and the
reserved water could only be used for agricultural purposes. The court should
have interpreted this language in light of the federal government's broader
purpose of providing Indians with skills to become self-sufficient. At the time
the Wind River Reservation was established, the most likely path to self-
sufficiency for Indian tribes in the area was through agriculture, but including
such terms could not reasonably have been meant to preclude the tribes from
using their lands and reserved water rights in other ways to increase the tribes'
economic self-sufficiency. Two of the five judges in Big Horn agreed with
this position, stating that the purpose of an Indian reservation should not be
limited to only agricultural use, but instead encompasses "any use that is
appropriate to the Indian homeland as it progresses and develops." 753 P.2d
at 119, 135 (Thomas and Hanscum, J.J., dissenting).
Second, even if the Big Horn court correctly interpreted the treaty as
reserving the Wind River lands solely for agricultural purposes, that treaty
fundamentally differs from the 1882 Executive Order establishing the Fish
River Reservation. In Big Horn, the treaty included specific and explicit
language about the federal government's intent to convert the Indians into
farmers. See, e.g., Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 95-96 ("In order to insure the
civilization of the tribes entering into this treaty, the necessity of education is
admitted, especially of such of them as are or may be settled on said
agricultural reservations.") (emphasis in original). The assumption was that
the Indians who agreed to the Wind River treaty understood and agreed to this
language. Here, in contrast, there is no evidence that the Fish River Indians
ever read or knew about the federal negotiator's letter to the President in
which he declared the intent to convert the Fish River Indians into an
agricultural community. Based on the limited record available, the Fish River
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol31/iss1/10
SPECIAL FEATURES
tribal leaders who negotiated for the establishment of the reservation probably
believed the purpose of the Executive Order was to give them a permanent
homeland on which they could fish and hunt free of interference from white
settlers.
In light of the text and circumstances surrounding the creation of the Fish
River Indian Reservation, the purpose of the Reservation was to provide a
permanent homeland for the Tribes and to allow the tribes "to diversify[] their
economies [away from agriculture] if they so choose and are reasonably able
to do so." Gila River, 35 P.3d at 76. Here, the government and the Fish River
Indians clearly envisioned that the Indians would use the Reservation for
fishing and agriculture because those were the two major activities by which
the Indians could support themselves. (R. at 1.) It is unreasonable, however,
to assume that the government meant for the Indians to restrict themselves to
using the land for agriculture when they could use the land in a more
productive fashion, such as for creating a tourism resort.
C. The Integer Supreme Court Should Have Granted All of the Tribes'
Claims for Water Because These Uses Further the Permanent Homeland
Purpose of the Fish River Reservation
1. Where the Purpose of the Indian Reservation Is to Provide a
Permanent Homeland, Courts Should Not Use the PIA Standard
The establishment of an Indian reservation reserves water in the "amount
necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reservation, no more." Washington,
375 F. Supp. 2d at 1064 (quoting Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 140). In quantifying
reserved Indian water rights, courts have commonly used the practicably
irrigable acreage ("PIA") standard first enunciated inArizona, 373 U.S. at 600
(affirming the Special Master's determination that "enough water was
reserved to irrigate all the practicably irrigable acreage on the reservations").
PIA is defined as "those acres susceptible to sustained irrigation at reasonable
costs." Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 101. Quantification of water rights using the
PIA standard requires a showing that crops can actually be grown on the land
using irrigation and that the irrigation is economically feasible. Gila River,
35 P.3d at 77-78.
The use of PIA as the default method for quantification of Indian reserved
water rights has been seriously criticized on several grounds. See generally
Martha C. Franks, The Uses of the Practicably Irrigable Acreage Standard in
the Quantification ofReserved Water Rights, 31 Nat. Resources J. 549 (1991)
(arguing that the PIA standard forces tribes to pursue economically irrational
development plans in order to obtain water rights). First, the Arizona Court
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did not explicitly state that PIA was the exclusive method for measuring
Indian reserved rights, see Arizona, 373 U.S. at 600; the Court merely
endorsed the application of PIA to determine water rights for the reservations
involved in the case before the Court. See id. at 601. Second, indiscriminate
use of PIA to quantify Indian reserved rights risks penalizing tribes based on
the location of the reservation. See Gila River, 35 P.3d at 78. Third, the
persistent use of the PIA standard is inconsistent with the overall decline in
agricultural acreage due to productivity increases and alternative methods of
revenue generation. See id. Finally, the PIA standard may actually award the
tribe more water than it needs to fulfill the purposes of the reservation, which
is inconsistent with the Cappaert "minimal need" rule. This penalizes non-
Indians who are seeking to use water from the same source and creates an
irrational distribution of water resources. See id,
In recognition of the limitations of the PIA standard, the Arizona Supreme
Court recently adopted a multi-factor quantification method tailored to the
factual circumstances of each reservation. Gila River, 35 P.3d at 79. The
court suggested that the following non-exclusive factors should be accounted
for in quantifying a tribe's reserved rights: (1) the tribe's historical use of
water in rituals; (2) cultural significance of water to the tribe; (3) the
geography, topography, and natural resources of the Indian reservation; (4) the
reservation's economic infrastructure; (5) past use of water for certain
purposes; and (6) the tribe's present and projected future population. Id. at
79-80.
Here, the use of the PIA standard to quantify the Fish River Reservation's
reserved water rights was incorrect because the purpose of the reservation was
to provide a permanent homeland for the Tribes and to encourage the Tribes
to use the resources of their lands to become economically self-sufficient.
Presently, only 10,000 acres of tribal lands are being irrigated for agricultural
purposes. (R. at 1.) Although another 25,000 acres could be used to grow
crops for agricultural purposes, (R. at 1), this may not be the most
economically rational use of reservation resources. Instead of using the PIA
standard to determine how much water the reservation should receive, the
Integer Supreme Court should have adopted the more flexible Gila River
inquiry.
2. The Integer Supreme Court Should Have Awarded the Tribes Enough
Water to Support Their DCMI, Heavy Commercial Use, Agricultural,
and Tribal Fisheries Claims Based on the Gila River Method
Treaties and agreements establishing Indian reservations are understood to
impliedly reserve enough water to make the reservation livable. Washington,
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375 F. Supp. 2d at 1064-65. Although water for DCMI use has often been
considered part of the reserved rights granted for agricultural use, Big Horn,
753 P.2d at 99, where agricultural water rights are small, the DCMI reserved
rights should be awarded and quantified separately, Washington, 375 F. Supp.
2d at 1066-67. Here, because the relative amounts of agricultural and DCMI
reserved rights are unknown, the court should have granted the Tribes'
separate claim for water for DCMI uses. Using the Gila River quantification
approach, the court should then have used estimates of future population in
conjunction with the present estimates of water consumption per capita to
determine the Tribes' minimal DCMI needs.
Because the Tribes' development plans for the tourist resort constitutes "the
optimal manner of creating jobs and income for the tribe [and] the most
efficient use of the water," the court should have granted the Tribes' heavy
commercial use claim. Gila River, 35 P.3d at 80 (quotation marks omitted).
The Fish River Indian Reservation resort, which will include a visitor center,
museum, golf course, and hotel, is part of the Tribes' comprehensive
economic development plan and represents the Tribes' rational decision to
capitalize on increasing interest in Native American life and the outdoors.
The development of a resort that will generate income and jobs for tribal
members fulfills the Reservation's twin purposes of providing a permanent
homeland for tribal members and increasing the Tribes' economic self-
sufficiency. The resort will provide jobs for tribal members, who otherwise
might have to leave the Reservation in order to earn a living. The resort will
also create an income stream for the Tribe that will allow the Tribe to render
improved services to Indians living on the tribal lands and will reduce the
Tribe's dependency on assistance from the federal government. As this use
of Reservation resources clearly advances the Reservation's purpose of
serving as a permanent homeland for tribal members, sufficient water to
support the resort development plan was reserved when the Reservation was
created.
The creation of an Indian reservation impliedly reserves enough water to
support present and anticipated future agricultural use of the land. See
Arizona, 373 U.S. 600-01; Colville, 647 F.2d at 48. Here, the purpose of
establishing the Reservation as a permanent homeland for the Tribes clearly
included providing the Tribes with the ability to cultivate as much land as
possible for agricultural purposes. The court correctly awarded the Tribes'
enough water to continue irrigation of the 10,000 acres currently put to
agricultural use. To the extent the remaining 25,000 acres of arable tribal land
can feasibly be put into agricultural production, the Tribes should be granted
sufficient water to irrigate all 25,000 acres, even though that will cause some
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of the non-Indian land to be withdrawn from agricultural production due to
lack of water.
Finally, when Indian reservations are created for the purpose of preserving
a tribe's access to fishing grounds, courts have held that the creation of the
reservation impliedly reserved sufficient instream flows to sustain the
operation of tribal fisheries. In Adair, 723 F.2d at 1414-15, the court agreed
that the creation of the Klamath Indian Reservation impliedly reserved enough
water to support a tribe's exercise of its retained fishing rights to the extent
required for the tribe to maintain a moderate living. The court based its
holding on an express provision in the treaty creating the reservation that
guaranteed the Klamaths exclusive fishing rights within their reservation. Id.
at 1409. In Colville, the court found an implied reservation of water to
support tribal fisheries even though the Executive Order creating the
reservation did not explicitly reserve the exclusive right to fish on the
reservation; the court, instead, relied upon the Indians' historic reliance upon
fishing to justify the reserved right. 647 F.2d at 47-48.
Here, the Tribes are in a similar position to the Colville Indians because the
Order establishing the Fish River Reservation did not explicitly reserve a right
to fish. The Tribes' historical reliance on Blue River fishing grounds and the
evidence that tribal leaders insisted on locating the Reservation near those
fishing grounds (R. at 1), however, support a finding that the creation of the
Reservation necessarily reserved sufficient instream flows to preserve those
fisheries to the extent needed to provide the Tribes with a moderate living.
See Adair, 723 F.2d at 1415. The Tribes, therefore, are entitled to instream
flows from the Blue River in the amount necessary "to support a productive
habitat" for tribal fisheries, even if the instream flows coupled with the Tribes
other water uses eliminate most existing non-Indian uses. United States v.
Adair, 187 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1277 (D. Or. 2002).
III. The Integer Supreme Court Correctly Determined That the Reacquired
Tribal Lands Hold a Priority Date of 1882
A. Winters Rights with a Date-Of-Reservation Priority Date Are Conveyed
from Indian Allottees to Non-Indian Purchasers
The creation of an Indian reservation impliedly reserves a right to a
sufficient quantity of water to fulfill the purposes of the reservation. Winters,
207 U.S. at 576-78. The priority date of Winters rights is the date that the
reservation is established. Id. at 577. Indian allottees possess a right to use
the water impliedly reserved by the creation of the reservation and that those
rights also hold a date-of-reservation priority date. See United States v.
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Powers, 305 U.S. 527, 532 (1939) ("[W]hen allotments were made for
exclusive use and thereafter conveyed in fee, the right to use some portion of
tribal waters essential for cultivation passed to the owners.")
Non-Indian purchasers of allotted land may acquire the "full quantity of
water available to the Indian allottee" with a date-of-reservation priority date.
Colville, 647 F.2d at 51;Adair, 723 F.2d at 1417; United States v. Anderson,
736 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1984). The non-Indian purchaser's right,
however, is subject to three constraints. First, the non-Indian water rights are
limited in quantity to those held by the Indian allottee. Colville, 647 F.2d at
51. Second, although the Indian allottee cannot lose his right to reserved
water through nonuse, the non-Indian purchaser only acquires the right "to
water being appropriated by the Indian allottee at the time title passes" and to
the water that the non-Indian appropriates "with reasonable diligence" after
title transfer; this right carries a date-of-reservation priority date. Id. The non-
Indian purchaser may, however, lose the right to the Indian allottee's reserved
water right through nonuse. Id. When a tribe reacquires lands within its
reservation sold to non-Indians by Indian allottees, the tribe acquires the water
rights appurtenant to the land that have not been lost through nonuse with their
date-of-reservation priority date. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1362; Big Horn, 753
P.2d at 114; Washington, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 1075.
B. The Reacquired Tribal Lands Hold an 1882 Priority Date Because the
Non-Indian Purchasers ofAllotted Land Did Not Lose Their Winters Rights
Through Nonuse
The Integer Supreme Court properly assigned an 1882 priority date to the
reacquired tribal lands. The 40,000 acres of reacquired land originally passed
to non-Indian purchasers through Indian allottees. (See R. at 1.) Under
Anderson, the non-Indian purchasers could have acquired and maintained the
full measure of the allottees' Winters rights through reasonable diligence and
continued use. There is no evidence in the record that the non-Indian
purchasers of the allotted land lost any of the original allottees' water rights
through nonuse. Thus, the Tribes reacquired the full measure of its original
Winters rights with their original priority date of 1882 when they purchased
the land from the non-Indian owners.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Integer Supreme Court
should be reversed with respect to questions 1 and 2, and affirmed with
respect to question 3.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
AMERICAN INDIAN LA WREVIEW
APPENDIX
"The McCarran Amendment"
43 U.S.C. § 666 - Suits for adjudication of water rights
(a) Joinder of United States as defendant; costs
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for
the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source,
or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United
States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and
the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States, when a
party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right to plead
that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not amenable
thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments,
orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review
thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs shall be
entered against the United States in any such suit.
(b) Service of summons
Summons or other process in any such suit shall be served upon the
Attorney General or his designated representative.
(c) Joinder in suits involving use of interstate streams by State
Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing the joinder of the
United States in any suit or controversy in the Supreme Court of the United
States involving the right of States to the use of the water of any interstate
stream.
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